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Anomaly or Augury? Global Food 
Prices Since 2007
Richard King
Abstract This article reviews the dynamics of global food prices since the food crisis of 2007–08, the extent 
to which international prices have influenced national prices and poverty and wellbeing outcomes, and 
considers whether this exceptional period represents an anomaly or likely signals future episodes of food 
price volatility. It finds that although some factors that contributed to recent events have eased considerably, 
some significant drivers remain structural threats to future food security. There is little reason to be 
confident that recent reductions in food prices and volatilities augur well for the food security or wellbeing 
of those living on low and precarious incomes in the future.
1 Introduction
Since the global food crisis of  2007–08, prices of  
staple foods have been higher and more volatile than 
in recent decades. There are many contributory 
causes, on both the supply and demand sides, 
and these have been the subject of  intense debate 
over recent years. There have equally been many 
responses aiming to dampen volatility and ameliorate 
the wider economic and wellbeing impacts of  food 
price volatility. As this IDS Bulletin goes to press, 
prices are once again on the decline and the violent 
volatility witnessed in recent years has diminished.
This article first reviews the macro-level trends and 
causes of  recent upheavals in global food prices, as 
well as policy responses to them. Second, it examines 
how these signals affect food prices paid in local 
markets, and looks at some consequential generalised 
poverty and food security outcomes. Finally, it 
considers whether these dynamics represent an 
anomaly in long-term trends or are harbingers of  the 
shape of  food markets in the future.
2 International food prices: trends, causes, policy 
responses
2.1 Trends
By one measure, over the whole of  the twentieth 
century food prices declined by an average of  0.7 per 
cent per year despite a significant increase in demand – 
testament to improving yields and ever greater volumes 
of  production (Dobbs et al. 2013; Sumner 2009). 
However, in early 2007 prices of  major internationally-
traded food commodity prices soared, dramatically 
accelerating an increase in prices noticeable from the 
turn of  the century. As measured by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of  the United Nations’ (FAO) 
composite food price index, by June 2008 prices were 
81 per cent higher than two years earlier in nominal 
terms. Despite the long-term trend, the absolute levels 
of  these prices were not unprecedented; in real terms 
similar levels were reached during the 1970s in the 
wake of  that decade’s oil crisis, albeit for a briefer 
period. There is some debate about how best to 
measure real food prices; Dorward (2011), for example, 
has noted that deflating by measures that are derived 
from expenditure patterns of  wealthier countries or 
populations, such as the World Bank’s Manufactures 
Unit Value Index, as used by the FAO real price index,1 
may not accurately capture low-income consumers’ 
experiences. Nonetheless, the recent price spikes 
represent a dramatic departure from the trend over 
the previous 20 years of  relatively stable prices, and 
the amplitude and duration of  the recent episode of  
elevated prices is significant in both real and nominal 
terms (see Figure 1).
The changes in these composite indices reflect the 
aggregate movements in the prices of  the underlying 
cereal, oil, meat, dairy and sugar food commodities 
that they capture. While each has a different profile, 
all have experienced significant turbulence in recent 
years. Among staple food crops that provide much 
of  the dietary energy to consumers in developing 
countries, international wheat and maize prices 
more or less trebled in 2008 compared with 2005 
prices, and rice prices more than doubled (see 
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Figure 2). After a dramatic fall in prices in 2009, the 
subsequent period was equally volatile, especially for 
maize prices. However, since April 2014 composite 
food indices and the international prices of  staple 
crops have fallen steadily to, by the beginning of  
2015, levels not seen since July 2010, posing the 
question of  whether we are coming to the end of  
an unusually turbulent episode in international food 
markets, or whether this is temporary respite prior to 
further episodes of  price escalations and volatility.
Figure 1 Real and nominal food price indices 1960–2015 (2000=100)
Source World Bank (2015) and FAO (2015a).
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Figure 2 Indexed nominal staple food prices 2005–14: $/mt (2005=100) 
Source World Bank (2015).
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Although these monthly price series give a quick 
visual impression of  month-to-month volatility, the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has 
devised a more statistically robust approach to assessing 
volatility in staple food markets. The model uses daily 
returns on the Chicago Board of  Trade to estimate 
95 per cent conditional quantiles and contrasts these 
estimates with realised returns over the previous 60 days. 
An instance of  extreme volatility is recorded where 
returns exceed the quantiles, and a test is performed to 
verify whether or not the number of  days characterised 
by excess volatility is statistically different from what 
would have been expected. Although there have 
been isolated extreme daily returns for all price series 
considered (hard and soft wheats, maize, soybean and 
rice) since 2012, these high levels of  returns have not 
sustained themselves for extended periods in a statistically 
significant manner, in the way that they did prior to 2013 
(IFPRI 2015; Martins-Filho pers. comm. 2015).
2.2 Causes
Many factors have contributed to the determination 
of  recent international food price movements; 
some are short-term phenomena, others are more 
structural in nature. Drawing on Wiggins and Keat’s 
(2013) schema, factors are divided into those that 
enabled, triggered and exacerbated price spikes. The 
relative importance of  these drivers is subject to live 
and contested debates, but there is broad consensus 
that the following elements have at least some 
bearing on contemporary food price movements.
2.2.1 Enabling factors
Agricultural slowdown, demand increase
As a result of  dwindling agricultural investment and 
bringing ever more marginal lands into production, 
global aggregate growth in yields plummeted to just 
over 1 per cent between 1990 and 2007 from an 
average of  2 per cent per year between 1970 and 
1990. This decline is projected to continue over the 
next decade to a fraction of  1 per cent. The share of  
land devoted to agriculture has also peaked (Oxfam 
2011). Combined with the lowest stock-to-use ratios 
since the 1970s, this slowdown in production growth 
resulted in agricultural markets very exposed to 
supply shocks. At the same time, demand increased 
due to demographic pressures and shifting dietary 
preferences. Global populations continue to grow 
and diets of  new middle-income consumers in many 
emerging economies are becoming increasingly 
Westernised, resulting in ever more demand for meat 
and dairy products. This means that cereal and oil 
crops do not only have to feed more humans but more 
livestock too, resulting in a less calorically-efficient 
conversion of  crop energy to human energy intake.
Fuel
Crops are facing increasing demand not only as 
sources of  food and feed, but as fuel too (sugar 
and maize for bioethanol, and vegetable oils for 
biodiesel). As agricultural crops have become 
increasingly substitutable for other sources of  
energy, and as fossil fuels have become more and 
Figure 3 Nominal food and energy price indices 1970–2014 (2010=100) 
Source World Bank (2015).
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more important inputs to agricultural production 
(as fertilisers and fuel for agricultural machinery), 
so too has the fate of  food prices become ever more 
intertwined with energy prices. The commodities 
supercycle of  the early twenty-first century resulted 
in a very close correlation between energy and fuel 
prices (see Figure 3).
2.2.2 Short-term triggers
Supply shocks
Given the very tight supply conditions, significant 
climatic shocks including droughts and floods in 
major grain-producing regions played a significant 
role in sending food prices soaring. In 2006, 
Australia and Canada were particularly badly 
affected. In 2012, maize and soybeans in the mid-
west of  the United States were subjected to the most 
severe drought and extreme heat since the 1950s; 
there was also a severe drought in the Black Sea 
region. Underlying these shocks are the enabling 
factors of  ecological degradation and a changing 
climate, increasing both the frequency and intensity 
of  such events as well as altering seasons and 
harvests in more insidious ways.
Biofuel mandates 
Biofuel production has increased dramatically 
since the beginning of  the century, accelerated by 
regulations in the EU, USA and Canada requiring 
minimum biofuel contents in gasoline and diesel, in 
effect producing fairly inelastic demand. The US is a 
major supplier to global maize markets but in 2010 
nearly 40 per cent of  US maize production went 
into vehicle engines rather than people’s stomachs 
(Oxfam 2011). In 2013 the UN High Level Panel 
of  Experts (HLPE) asserted, ‘Everything else being 
equal, the introduction of  a rigid biofuel demand 
does affect food commodity prices’, and that ‘in the 
last few years (since 2004) of  short-term commodity 
food price increase [sic], biofuels did play an 
important role’ (HLPE 2013: 14).
2.2.3 Exacerbating factors
Trade policies 
Knee-jerk export bans and taxes, import subsidy 
reductions, and mass public procurements in the 
immediate wake of  price increases, while providing 
some short-run security for national supplies, acted 
as accelerants on price movements, pushing prices 
higher and reducing trust in international markets.
Financialisation 
Between 2005 and 2011, the value of  financial 
investments in commodity-related assets increased 
almost nine times to US$450 billion, more than 
US$100 billion of  which was invested in agricultural 
commodities (Dobbs et al. 2013). The degree to 
which the level and stability of  agricultural spot 
prices are affected by high volumes and high 
frequencies of  speculative capital entering and 
exiting agricultural futures markets is highly 
contested. It is beyond the scope of  this article to 
unpick the debate, beyond noting that there does 
seem to be some level of  consensus that ‘increased 
participation by non-commercial actors such as 
index funds, swap dealers and money managers in 
financial markets probably acted to amplify short-
term price swings and could have contributed to 
the formation of  price bubbles in some situations’ 
(FAO et al. 2011: 12).
2.3 Policy responses
Policy responses to the initial global price spike 
in 2007–08 by both national governments and 
international agencies were largely myopic and 
uncoordinated. At least 25 food-exporting countries 
either banned or increased taxes on exports as a 
result of  the global shock, further destabilising 
international markets. These trade measures 
have historically tended, at least initially, to be 
more effective at stabilising domestic prices than 
building-up buffer stocks, but tend to ultimately 
lead to a ‘typical prisoner’s dilemma where the 
world market is trapped in a non-cooperative 
equilibrium’ (Gouel 2013: 34). Many importing 
countries reduced import taxes, largely ineffectually, 
and concerns about scarcity of  supply led to mass 
public procurement from international markets. 
It rapidly became apparent that information and 
communication about stock levels and production 
forecasts were very patchy and delayed, which 
contributed to uncertainty and rash decision-making 
(FAO et al. 2011).
In many cases, producers were given support in 
meeting the rising input costs of  feed and fertilisers. 
Consumer support was offered in the form of  cash 
transfers and direct food assistance, but in many 
places the rapidity and magnitude of  price increases 
quickly eroded the purchasing power of  both 
mechanisms, which in any case tended to favour 
urban consumers more than their rural counterparts 
(Pinstrup-Anderson 2015). Additionally, many 
countries lacked sufficient pre-existing administrative 
infrastructure to roll out these schemes with any 
degree of  effectiveness (ibid.).
A few years on there is growing consensus that 
effective responses should likely comprise some mix 
of  the following elements.
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2.3.1 Better market information and cooperation
It is unlikely that resorting to self-interested unilateral 
trade measures in times of  market uncertainty will 
ever be entirely eliminated, but better and more 
timely market information can certainly help. The 
Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), 
established as part of  the Action Plan on Food Price 
Volatility at the G20 meeting in June 2011, aims to 
improve global market transparency. It includes a 
Rapid Response Forum to ‘promote early discussion 
among decision-level officials about critical market 
conditions to encourage the coordination of  
policies and the development of  common strategies’ 
(AMIS 2015a). AMIS has been operating since 
September 2012, and while still fledgling, improved 
information-sharing and transparency may have 
helped in avoiding panicked unilateral trade policies 
in response to the soaring prices in July 2012. 
However, a 2015 review of  progress notes (alongside 
successes) inadequate data transfers from participating 
Figure 4a Indexed nominal world and national rice prices 2006–15
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Figure 4b Indexed nominal world and national maize prices 2006–15
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countries, with only five countries honouring their 
commitment to submit monthly forecasts of  their 
crop balances (AMIS 2015b).
2.3.2 Emergency food reserves
Despite persisting questions about the effectiveness 
of  widespread generalised buffer stocks, emergency 
food reserves that mitigate against short-run 
supply constraints appear to be a viable and vital 
mechanism to reduce the resilience of  food markets 
to shocks. Managing these regionally may prove 
to be the most effective means of  implementation 
(cf. FAO et al. 2011; Gouel 2013).
2.3.3 Ex ante domestic social protection and safety 
net programmes
Recent events have demonstrated that introducing 
ad hoc safety nets from scratch in response to shocks 
is frequently ineffectual. Equally, as the Life in a 
Time of  Food Price Volatility research has revealed, 
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Figure 4c Indexed nominal world and national wheat prices 2006–15
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Source World prices: World Bank (2015), National prices: FAO (2015b)
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where social protection programmes do exist they 
tend to be valued by beneficiaries both as a support 
mechanism and an overt demonstration that the 
government is doing something in response to price 
shocks. But for these to be successful they need to be 
geographically and economically scalable in times 
of  crisis and they need to build on and complement 
people’s own informal coping mechanisms rather 
than crowding-out or seeking to replace existing 
reciprocal agreements and social contracts.
2.3.4 Control of financialisation of markets
Both Europe and the US have introduced hard 
limits on commodity-derivatives speculation, 
capping the number of  over-the-counter contracts 
in a particular commodity (including agricultural 
commodities) that can be held by a trader or 
group of  traders. This prevents disproportionate 
concentration of  resources, ensuring that speculators 
do not exert an excessive influence on spot prices.2 
Further reforms of  increasing severity might 
include improving transparency of  positions by 
bringing over-the-counter derivative transactions 
onto exchanges, restricting high frequency trading, 
imposing limits on the total amount of  speculative 
money in agricultural markets, and restricting 
participation in futures markets to those with vested 
interests in the underlying agricultural commodities 
(Spratt 2013).
2.3.5 Agricultural investment
Perhaps the most positive outcome of  recent price 
spikes has been renewed interest in investing in the 
productivity and resilience of  developing country 
agriculture, reversing decades of  neglect as a key 
economic sector. However, public investment in 
small-scale agriculture is still far short of  where 
it needs to be to ensure a resilient sector and 
resilient rural households (Wise and Murphy 2012). 
Appropriate investment in small-scale agriculture 
and rural economies has the potential to improve 
food security through both reducing food price 
volatility and helping farmers and households to 
better cope when volatility does occur (FAO et al. 
2011). However, there have also been significant 
large-scale speculative land acquisitions in low-
income countries with weak governance, which 
threaten to undermine the local population’s access 
to land and food security.
3 Local conditions and outcomes: price 
transmission and wellbeing
Important as they are, the international market 
dynamics presented in the preceding section do 
not fully reflect the realities faced by consumers 
purchasing their food in domestic markets, or 
producers selling their produce into the same. 
This section considers how the linkages between 
international food prices and wellbeing are mediated.
3.1 International price transmission
Local market prices are unevenly influenced by 
international markets, but are also subject to local 
factors with little or no bearing on prices elsewhere, 
such as domestic policy measures and idiosyncratic 
supply shocks. Recent analysis of  price transmissions 
from international to domestic cereal markets in 
developing countries suggests that, on average, 
approximately three-quarters of  international price 
changes may be transmitted to domestic markets, 
and it takes six to seven months for half  of  an 
international price shock to be transmitted to local 
prices (Greb et al. 2012).3 However, there is significant 
variation around this mean depending on many 
factors including exchange rates (which possess 
their own dynamics, and which impact on border 
prices and are linked to local market prices through 
a variety of  factors and mechanisms); reliance on 
food imports (which is related to national production 
and stock levels); transportation costs, especially 
for interior countries; physical infrastructure; 
government subsidies and trade-policy interventions, 
including, for example, import duties, export taxes 
and non-tariff barriers (World Bank 2012; Naylor 
and Falcon 2010; FAO et al. 2011).
Overall, domestic and global maize markets 
appear to have a below-average prevalence of  
‘cointegration’, and rice markets have above-average 
prevalence. A study of  the Tanzanian maize market 
found that regional markets exert more influence 
on domestic prices than do global prices (Baffes, 
Kshirsagar and Mitchell 2015). While most countries 
are wheat and maize price-takers, the determination 
of  international rice prices is less clear. Regionally, 
domestic prices in African and Asian markets are 
less likely to be co-integrated with international 
prices (Greb et al. 2012). In sub-Saharan Africa, 
where domestic food price volatility is high, Minot 
(2012) found no evidence that these volatilities 
increased further from 2007 to 2010, despite the 
increasing volatility for international grain prices. 
However, Greb et al. (2012) found a general increase 
in domestic price volatility since July 2007 (even 
among prices that are not co-integrated with their 
international equivalents), and found domestic prices 
to be most volatile in East and West Africa, followed 
by Latin America. Generally, local market price 
volatility is greater than that in international markets 
(Zoyra et al. 2014).
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There is also a question as to whether domestic 
prices respond to international market signals 
equally when prices are declining as they do when 
prices are rising. Some evidence at least suggests that 
local prices may be ‘sticky’ and remain elevated even 
when international prices are cooling off (Ghosh 
2010).
As Figures 4a, 4b and 4c show, there are similarities 
but not direct correlations between international 
prices and prices in domestic markets for rice, 
maize and wheat, staple crops in the ten countries 
considered in the Life in a Time of  Food Price 
Volatility research. In Zambian maize markets, 
for example, the removal of  consumption and 
production subsidies in May 2013 had a major 
bearing on the subsequent escalation of  national 
maize prices, in spite of  global maize prices falling 
over the same period. Although only illustrative, this 
serves to demonstrate that the economic realities 
faced by people making purchases in local markets 
are affected by far more than the dynamics of  
international markets. These difficult purchasing 
decisions themselves and their impacts on people’s 
overall food and nutritional security and general 
wellbeing are, in turn, mediated by far more than 
price dynamics alone, as other articles in this IDS 
Bulletin attest.
3.2 Diverse food baskets
Nutritious and satiating meals are not comprised 
singularly of  staple carbohydrate-rich foodstuffs, 
but also of  foods that meet protein, fat and 
micronutrient requirements. As the Life in a Time 
of  Food Price Volatility research has demonstrated, 
people’s personal preferences regarding the 
composition of  their diets, and their abilities to 
source and consume foods that meet preferential 
and nutritional needs varies considerably. 
But nowhere are food consumption costs and 
budgetary considerations determined by the price 
of  one commodity alone. Quarterly World Food 
Programme (WFP) assessments of  the changing 
costs of  typical food baskets in the ten countries 
demonstrates that, as of  the end of  2014, prices 
remained above their five-year averages everywhere 
except Vietnam, even if  they have declined from 
quarter to quarter (see Table 1).
Food prices are also changing in the context of  
broader shifts in living costs and wages. Generalised 
inflation metrics are wholly unsatisfactory measures 
of  living costs of  people on low and precarious 
wages as their costs can vary significantly from the 
average, and securing sufficient income to cover 
costs can be a daily struggle rather than a smoothed 
monthly challenge. Nonetheless, Figure 5 gives a 
sense of  generalised and food price inflation in the 
Table 1 Percentage change in the total cost of the food basket relative to the average prices for the same month over 
the last five years
2013 Q2 2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2014 Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4
BFA 9 0 2 2 3 -3 2
BGD 5 9 13 13 25 22 17
BOL 8 17 20 18 41 24 9
ETH 16 15 25 20 38 38 39
GTM 17 17 17 11 24 26 29
IDN 20 18 17 16 24 20 21
KEN 21 17 16 14 22 18 26
PAK 13 17 17 19 39 30 26
VNM -4 11 -6
ZMB 13 19 14 16 35 34 17
Low (< 0%) Moderate (0–5%) High (5–10%) Severe (> 10%)
Source WFP (2015).
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Life in a Time of  Food Price Volatility countries 
since 2012. In some places, Bolivia, Guatemala and 
Indonesia, food prices have clearly driven up overall 
living costs, whereas in Bangladesh, food prices have 
risen more slowly than other costs.
Overall, we see a very mixed picture in terms of  the 
levels and stability of  food costs faced by consumers 
in recent years, driven and mediated to varying 
degrees by international market dynamics. Although 
these markets set the macro context in which 
national and household responses are formulated, 
they do not fully capture the lived realities in which 
decisions are taken and varying degrees of  wellbeing 
are realised.
3.3 Wellbeing outcomes
Other articles in this issue of  the IDS Bulletin give a 
rich picture of  the context in which individuals and 
households are taking, or not taking, conscious and 
unconscious decisions that have a bearing on their 
own and their families’ overall wellbeing and food 
and nutritional security, both short and long term. 
In some cases, food prices are clearly pre-eminent 
or significant contextual factors; in others the 
importance of  food prices is less pronounced. But 
where food prices are contributory factors to personal 
and policy choices, they may have a bearing on 
decision-making either due to their absolute realised 
levels, or as a result of  the uncertainty that volatility 
creates about future realities. Where sentiment is a 
driver in decision-making, this can create a reality 
of  its own if  individual and/or policy choices are 
made in expectation of  an outcome, whether or 
not that actually materialises. For example, in the 
expectation of  tight supply markets several exporting 
nations introduced export controls in 2008 and 2011, 
precipitating similar actions elsewhere, spreading 
a collapse in confidence, and further constraining 
international supplies (Lee et al. 2012). Here we 
consider some of  the aggregate outcomes for 
individuals’ wellbeing in which food price dynamics, 
or suppositions about those dynamics, are implicated.
Based on simulation models and data from 31 
developing countries, Ivanic and Martin (2014) 
estimate the monetary poverty-inducing effects of  
price rises of  varying magnitudes and various foods. 
They find, unsurprisingly, adverse implications 
of  higher prices for poverty in the short run, even 
for farming households, many of  whom are net 
consumers. However, the aggregate impacts over the 
longer term are more positive, though highly diverse. 
These modelled benefits are achieved as a result of  
wages and agricultural prices adjusting. It would be 
disingenuous, however, to suggest that the potential 
longer-term adjustments negate the short-term 
pain, as consumers on low incomes with little to no 
savings are not able to smooth their consumption 
in the same way that those with higher savings 
Figure 5 Food and general price inflation 2012–14
BGD
BOL
BFA
ETH
GTM
IDN
KEN
PAK
VNM
ZMB
Jan 12 Apr 12 Jul 12 Oct 12 Jan 13 Apr 13 Jul 13 Oct 13 Jan 14 Apr 14 Jul 14 Oct 14
General consumer price inflation 
(Jan 2012=0)
Food price inflation (Jan 2012=0)
Source ILO (2015).
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might. Equally the process of  wage adjustment is 
not uniform or automatic, but often highly uneven 
and contested. Headey (2014), who also finds an 
empirical relationship between higher food prices 
and poverty reduction, acknowledges that such 
adjustments do not happen instantaneously and that 
the welfare of  poor net consumers, particularly in 
urban areas, is significantly negatively affected by 
high food prices in the short term.
A review of  the empirical evidence and simulation 
studies (DFID 2014) finds both positive and negative 
impacts of  food price changes on poverty, but that 
low-income households benefiting from price rises 
are typically outnumbered by those losing out; in 
the short term both the prevalence and depth of  
poverty increase. The review suggests that ‘second-
round responses to food price increases such as 
upward pressure on unskilled rural wages and 
changes in household production decisions may 
reduce a welfare loss, but is not conclusive’ (p4) – a 
complexity mirrored by the findings of  the Life in a 
Time of  Food Price Volatility research.
While an absolute rise in food prices over a 
sustained period may have potential benefits for 
poverty reduction and permit greater investment in 
agricultural and other rural sectors, it is less clear 
that volatility or rapid price adjustments have a 
positive impact over a similar time frame. Volatility 
creates uncertainty and risk premiums that can 
forestall effective planning and decision-making, 
resulting in opportunities for investment going 
unfulfilled, both at household and macroeconomic 
levels (cf. Cavalcanti et al. 2012; FAO et al. 2011). 
One might therefore expect excessive volatility 
to introduce a significant negative influence on 
higher prices’ long-run poverty-reducing potential. 
However, focusing on five least-developed countries, 
Magrini, Opazo and Balié (2015) find that 
households would benefit more from preventing or 
limiting increases in cereal prices than from reducing 
their volatility, though they acknowledge that the 
impact of  volatility in their study design is less 
observable owing to households’ varying capacities 
to manage and cope with risk. They also find that 
price volatility harms the poorest households most, 
especially in urban areas, with significant differences 
between the poorest and the richest households.
But beyond impacts on direct monetary poverty, 
short-run price shocks can additionally lock-in 
long-term changes in wellbeing. For instance, 
decisions to migrate in search of  additional or 
better paid work may be taken in response to 
immediate economic realities, but the consequences 
of  those decisions, such as relationship breakdowns, 
may endure significantly longer than the initial 
galvanising situation. Equally, even short-lived 
disruptions to children’s nutrient intakes can have 
lifelong impacts if  they result in stunting or lower 
educational outcomes (Young Lives 2008). The 
impact on micro- and macro-nutrient intake, as 
opposed to pure caloric sufficiency, is important for 
food and nutritional security. A systematic review 
of  the evidence on the effects of  rising food prices 
on food consumption (Green et al. 2013)4 finds a 
greater negative effect on food consumption in 
lower-income countries and in poorer households 
within countries. Across national wealth categories, 
it found food price rises were most likely to reduce 
demand for animal source foods such as meat, fish 
and dairy, with less impact on demand for dietary 
staples such as cereals, suggesting that dietary 
nutrient diversity is likely to be compromised before 
caloric intake, especially in developing nations. 
However, even in the relatively prosperous EU, 
where food consumption typically assumes a much 
smaller share of  household spending than in lower-
income countries, there is evidence that higher 
retail food prices are associated with (moderately 
small) increases in the percentage of  food-deprived 
households, even controlling for household sizes and 
disposable incomes (García-Germán, Bardají and 
Garrido 2015).
4 Conclusions
Are recent reductions in the levels and volatility of  
international food prices signalling an end to or 
a hiatus in the shocks of  recent years? Although 
some contributory factors such as very tight stock-
to-use ratios and sky-high oil prices have eased 
considerably, and some positive developments have 
been made in market regulation and transparency, 
it is also true that some significant structural drivers 
remain spectres looming on the horizon, and 
investments in the resilience of  populations and 
agricultures largely remain woefully inadequate. 
There is little to instil confidence that recent respites 
augur well for future food security and wellbeing in 
the medium term. Climatic shocks are only going 
to become more frequent and severe; demand 
and competition for resources are only going to 
intensify. Whether or not Malthus’s ghost will end up 
haunting us, achieving food and nutritional security 
in this emerging context will not be straightforward, 
and it would be foolhardy to discount the prospect 
of  future food supply shocks and squeezes of  some 
sort well into the future.
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As we have seen, international food market dynamics 
are an important part of  the context in which people 
on low and precarious incomes seek to fulfil their 
own and their families’ food and nutritional security 
and wellbeing. But they are just one component 
among many. Prices in local markets where people 
buy, sell and barter for their food are additionally 
influenced by a multitude of  idiosyncratic factors. 
Food prices may now assume a greater prominence 
in people’s decision-making, and sudden shifts can 
certainly catalyse changes in lives that endure well 
beyond the initial impetus. But people’s life chances 
and circumstances are mediated and threatened 
by far more than food prices alone. Rarely is life in 
a time of  food price volatility eased or bettered by 
these uncertain global dynamics, but rarely is life 
truly a result of  global food price volatility.
Notes
1 For further information see FAO (2013) and 
http://go.worldbank.org/SZXEODLF60.
2 In Europe this is via reform to the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID); in the 
US the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) has new authority under the 2010 Dodd-
Frank financial regulation.
3 Similarly, an analysis of  the price spike of  1972–6 
found that domestic prices for 12 agricultural 
commodities in developing countries reflected just 
over half  of  the peak in world prices (Anderson 
and Nelgen (2010), cited in Naylor and Falcon 
(2010)).
4 Not limited to post-2007 episodes.
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